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Mitigating the Problem of Vulture Holdout:
International Certification Boards for Sovereign Debt Restructurings
John A. E. Pottow, University of Michigan Law School, August 2013.

The Great Recession has brought greater sovereign debt defaults, which in turn has
brought a surfeit of academic explorations and policy discussions of sovereign debt restructuring.
The purpose of this article is to offer yet one more idea for the hopper of what to do with the
seemingly intractable problem of restructuring sovereign bond debt.1 The field does not lack for
statutory and contractual proposals, from SDRM to CACs, but it is not yet sufficiently saturated
that another proposal cannot join the mix.2 The proposal is for the establishment of international
certification boards that can give a stamp of approval to workout proposals for bond debt that is
(at least in part) privately held. The reason for the boards is to combat the problem of holdouts in
an age of vulture funds and other new-age sovereign debt investors. The boards are deliberately
non-judicial and will have no hard law power by design. Nonetheless, it is suggested that these
boards will have an incremental effect in coalescing agreement around sovereign debt
restructuring proposals.
To make the case of the boards requires some foundational legwork. First, this article
discusses the persistence of the holdout problem in sovereign debt restructurings. Second, it
discusses the specific conduct of vulture funds and other investment actors who are likely to
1

For a comprehensive review of sovereign debt restructurings, see Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou, &
Chrisoph Trebesch, Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950‐2010: Concepts, Literature Survey, and Stylized Facts (Int’l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 12/203, 2012).
2
Those who abhor acronyms should know that SDRM stands for the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism first
put forth by the IMF/World Bank that withered on the vine back in the early 2000s, and CAC stands for Collective
Action Clause, a provision now commonplace in sovereign debt issuances that permit supermajoritarian thresholds
to adjust repayment terms (i.e., consent to principal reductions). INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK, 12‐14 (2013).
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accentuate and indeed crystallize the holdout problem, arguing not just a problem of holdouts
qua holdouts, but of pernicious knock-on effects to the international legal order generally and to
the law of sovereign debt particularly. The foundation thus laid, consideration proceeds to
certification boards and how they might play a role in combatting these problems.
I.

Holdout: Still a Problem with Sovereign Debt Restructurings.

The initial proposition that animates this proposal is a firm conviction that of all the
challenges to sovereign debt default that have been well documented by others (moral hazard,
taxpayer burden, odiousness, etc.), the principal one—at least for those coming from the world of
bankruptcy—is that of holdout. One of the key attributes of a bankruptcy system is the ability to
bind all stakeholders to an in rem resolution of restructured obligations,3 and more specifically
the ability to bind holdouts to blunt their potentially destructive impulses.4
Indeed, in the high-profile dispute between NML and Argentina in the Second Circuit,
the court has repeatedly bemoaned the lack of a bankruptcy system to turn to as a way out of the
mess.5 As Judge Griesa pointedly complained, “Unlike bankruptcy courts, which have significant

3

See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004) (A bankruptcy court’s in rem jurisdiction
permits it to ‘determin[e] all claims that anyone, whether named in the action or not, has to property or thing in
question. The proceeding is ‘one against the world.’”); Shawhan v. Wherritt, 48 U.S. 627 (1849) (“No creditor can,
by instituting proceedings in a state court after the commission of an act of bankruptcy by his debtor, obtain a
valid lien upon property conveyed by such fraudulent deed, if he has notice of the commission of an act of
bankruptcy by the debtor. It passes to the assignee of the bankrupt for the benefit of all creditors.”). See also 28
U.S.C. §1334(e) (“The district court in which a case under Title 11 is commenced or pending shall have exclusive
jurisdiction [] of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of
property of the estate . . . .”).
4
Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 439, 467 (1992) ( “[W]ithout bankruptcy,
negotiation and holdout problems could impose even greater costs on a debtor than does negotiation within
bankruptcy, which prevents destructive individual creditor action.”). See 11 U.S.C. s. 1129(a)(9) (deploying super‐
majoritarian voting rules to bind dissidents); cf. id. At 1129(b) (providing alternative dissident‐binding procedure).
5
One pair of commentators suggests that the court was trying mediate a debt swap between the holdouts and the
institutional investors in this case to fill the gap left by the lack of an SDRM, thus serving two of that proposal’s
functions (aggregation and transition). See Marcus H. Miller and Dania Thomas, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The
Judge, Vultures, and Creditor Rights, 30 The World Economy 1491 (2007).
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power to reallocate debtors’ assets to satisfy creditor claims, the court in this case is limited to enforcing
6

the terms of the specific contracts before it.” Accordingly, the holdout problem not just real but a

serious challenge in need of continued attention by policymakers.
This concern over holdouts is fully mindful of the limited incidence of public debt
“proceedings,” under even the most capacious definition of that term. There have only been 180
sovereign debt restructurings from 1970 to 2010,7 and most of them have not reached Argentine
levels of acrimony.8 So, too, are some defaults “too small fish to fry” for putative holdouts.9 All
that being said, the fact that we see the holdout problem in Argentina, where approximately
93%—surely a super-majority by whatever metric one uses—consented to the bond exchanges,
means that the holdout problem is alive and thriving.10

6

NML Capital, Ltd. v. The Republic of Arg., No. 05 Civ. 2434 (TPG); 06 Civ. 6466 (TPG); 7 Civ. 2690 (TPG); 05 Civ.
3328 (TPG); 05 Civ. 4239 (TPG); 05 Civ. 10201 (TPG); 07 Civ. 2349 (TPG); 06 Civ. 5887 (TPG); 07 Civ. 1797 (TPG),
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21530, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. March 18, 2009). See also NML Capital, Ltd. v. The Republic of
Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, FN 2 (2nd Cir. Oct. 26, 2012) (noting that “in the event of a debt crisis, sovereigns wishing
to honor some portion of their defaulted debt must negotiate with individual creditors or groups of creditors to
effect restructurings,” which leave “in their wake so‐called ‘holdout’ creditors”).
7
The probability of litigation and the number of cases both vary directly with the size of the proposed haircut,
Julian Schumacher, Chrisoph Trebesch, Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor
Litigation 1976‐2010¸(December 16, 2012), Working Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189997 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2189997. (“A one standard deviation increase in haircuts (28 percentage points)
almost doubles the probability of filing suit, from 7 to 14%. We also find that haircuts are a good predictor for the
number of cases.”).
8
Id. at 3, 11‐12 (noting that half of sovereign litigation pertains to the large‐haircut restructurings of Argentina and
Peru because “countries imposing larger debt write‐downs are more likely to be sued for full repayment”).
9
Andres Schipani, Ecuador: too small of a fish to fry for vulture funds, FT.com (last accessed March 24, 2013
11:35am), available at http://blogs.ft.com/beyond‐brics/2012/11/23/ecuador‐too‐small‐of‐a‐fish‐to‐fry‐for‐
vulture‐funds/#axzz2DKZs5IDy (contrasting the $3.2 billion Ecuadorian default in 2008 with the $81 billion
Argentine default in 2001 and remarking that the Argentine default involved “big players” and “big funds . . . with
enough power to afford lengthy and costly legal procedures”).
10
Agustino Fontevecchia, The Real Story of How a Hedge Fund Detained a Vessel In Ghana and Even Went for
Argentina’s ‘Air Force One’, Forbes.com, available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/10/05/the‐real‐story‐behind‐the‐argentine‐vessel‐in‐ghana‐
and‐how‐hedge‐funds‐tried‐to‐seize‐the‐presidential‐plane/ (last accessed March 27, 2013 at 1:57pm).
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Nor ought one be assuaged by the rise of CACs (either payment or non-payment),11
although to be sure this makes the severity of the holdout problem a closer question.
Theoretically, CACs seem at first to be elegant solutions to the holdout problem, and their
increased prevalence means either that the market thinks so too or that the market is close
enough to thinking so that the signaling herd is stampeding thus.12 But serious commentators
contend that CACs do not fix the holdout problem altogether,13 and their arguments have force.
(Greece presents as stark recent example where CACs did not prevent holdouts.)14 Indeed, there
are at least two ways in which holdout problems cannot be solved by CACs. First, as an
empirical matter, vulture funds (whom will be scapegoated as quintessential holdouts for
expositional ease) may easily be able to marshal blocking positions, especially when a sovereign
has issued multiple rounds of debt.15 Second, as a more structural matter, it could be that the
legal community is so ingenious that anytime you think you’ve fixed something they just
outmaneuver you at every turn. Consider, for example, how seemingly unanimous Unanimous
Consent Clauses got hobbled by Exit Consents.16 (Some unanimities are more unanimous than

11

Marco Committeri & Francesco Spadafora, You Never Give Me Your Money? Sovereign Debt Crises, Collective
Action Problems, and IMF Lending 17 (IMF Working Paper WP/13/20 January 2013).
12
Id. CACs and other market instruments, such a minimum participation thresholds and exit consents, have helped
to ensure high rates of participation. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 28 & n.24 (2013).
13
A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 Emory L. J. 997, 1015
(2004) (“Even if all new bonds contained CACs, there would still be a creditor coordination problem because the
holders of old, longer maturity bonds could still rely on the UACs in those bonds to thwart the sovereign’s debt
restructuring negotiations.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It All?, 52 Emory L.J. 417, 423
(2003) (arguing that CACs are not all that attractive when considering a sovereign’s complicated borrowing
structure often has multiple classes of bonds and the problem that CACs lack a stay to halt collections while
creditors and sovereign negotiate the restructuring) ; Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?:
The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 Emory L.J. 1043, 1095 ( 2004). (noting that CACs as of
2004 failed to eliminate the strategic use of litigation largely because of a lack of “jurisprudence clarifying the
rights and responsibilities of creditor groups in restructurings”).
14
IMF Report at 28.
15
Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring,
53 Emory L.J. 1043, 1095 ( 2004).
16
Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring,
53 Emory L.J. 1043, 1091 ( 2004) (“As a condition of the exchange offer, creditors accepting the offer are required

4
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others?) Maybe those instances were outrages, or maybe they were just a manifestation of the
legal world devising creative workarounds to transactional problems.
The first, empirical point on the inefficacy of CACs is not theoretically problematic.
Sure, anyone can hold out, whatever your voting threshold is, but there’s nothing that can be
done about that. (More specifically, the tougher one wants to make it to acquire a blocking
position, the less consensus one must tolerate for the restructuring – because the voting threshold
must be lowered – which means there is a zero-sum theoretical fight between consensus and
holdout-potential.)17 The second point creates more concern. It is difficult to escape the nagging
feeling that CACs won’t do it all, even if they do do a lot.18 In any event, even if the happy
outcome of CACs’ fixing much or all of the holdout problem comes to pass, we are still left with
the legacy issue of pre-CAC issuances, which represent enough money that holdouts remain a
serious problem to the restructuring of sovereign debt.19 Moreoever, it is far from clear this is a
mere legacy issue, as some recent empirical scholarship suggests,20 and the specter of holdouts
continues to stalk policymakers in Europe:
it is the undisguised fear of holdouts and the prospect of a messy, Argentine‐style debt restructuring in the belly of
Europe that has been one of the principal motivations for the official sector’s willingness to use its taxpayer money

[by exit consents] to consent to various modifications to the terms of the original debt that reduce its value . . . The
amendments are designed to make the original bonds less valuable, thereby making their retention less attractive
to investors.”).
17
Beyond the scope of this discussion are aggregation clauses, which alleviate some of this problem.
18
See Declaration of Stephen Choi at 8-10 NML Capital, Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina 2012

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168292 (Nov. 21, 2012) (No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 90 Civ. 1707(TPG), 09 Civ.
1708 (TPG) (opining as paid expert on the benefits of CACs).

19

A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 Emory L. J. 997, 1015‐16
(2004).
20
Lee c. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati, Ignacio Tirado, The Problem of Holdout Creditors in Eurozone Sovereign Debt
Restructurings, Working Paper (1/22/2013), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5485&context=faculty_scholarship

5
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013

5

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 81 [2013]

to repay, in full and on time, all of the private sector creditors of Eurozone countries receiving bailouts (the belated
Greek restructuring being the sole exception).21

Accordingly, CACs or not, holdout is still a problem in the sovereign debt arena looking
for solutions.

II.

Vulture Funds and the Problem of Costly, Uncoordinated Litigation.

The second proposition that must be established before turning to the certification boards
proposal regards vulture funds in particular: not only do they present a theoretical risk of
holdout-ism – as seen with, for example, Peru22 – but they are excessively tenacious in their
litigation strategies, which has systemic costs, both for the international community generally
and for the development of a coherent body of sovereign debt law specifically.23
Vulture funds are easy scapegoats for free-floating malaise,24 and policymakers have
directed an inordinate amount of hostility in recent years toward hedge funds, perhaps preferring
to point the finger at external investors as opposed to government regulators in laying blame to
the credit crisis. Indeed, some countries have gone so far as to introduce legislation that would
21

Id. at 1. Interestingly, this appears to be a change from earlier scholarly understanding (by the same
knowledgeable observers): “Second, in stark contrast to the 1990s and 2000s, no policy maker has identified a
collective action problem for collective action clauses to solve in European sovereign debt. To be sure, few doubt
that there is a debt problem—but no one has described a coordination problem.” See Anna Gelpern and G. Mitu
Gulati, “Foreword: Of Lawyers, Leaders, and Returning Riddles in Sovereign Debt,” 73 Law and Contemp. Probs. I, ii
(2010) available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol73/iss4/1/ (emphasis added).
22

Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring,
53 Emory L.J. 1043, 1084‐85 ( 2004).
24

Funds are easy scapegoats for free-floating malaise. Consider, for example, the U.S. proposal
to tax capital gains for hedge fund managers as constructive income, which one might safely
characterize as a “novel” development under taxation law. S. 1626.IS, 110th Cong. (2007)l H.R. 1935
(2009) (reintroduced).

6
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limit hedge fund recoveries against sovereign debtors,25 an expressive gesture of ire (or at the
very least an unprecedented “un-waiver” of sovereign immunity by another sovereign).26 But
there’s surely something at the root of these grumblings. In the sovereign debt area, vulture
funds seem to be at the vanguard of using the private mechanism of litigation and judicial
process to collect on defaulted sovereign debt. Consider what happened with the Argentine debt
and the ARA Fragata Libertad.27 Ellioit/NML refused to tender its bonds to the exchange offer
put forth by Argentina (both pre- and post Lock Law),28 deciding instead to sue. To realize its
judgment, NML was willing to travel the globe in search of Argentine assets.29 Too wise to

25

In 2008 and 2010, Belgium and the United Kingdom, respectively, passed national legislation limiting the
potential recovery of holdout hedge funds against debtor nations. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the
independent expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on
the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social, and cultural rights, 14thSess., ¶¶ 48‐53, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/14/21 (April 29 2010) [hereinafter Human Rights Council Report]. A similar proposal was proposed in
the United States by House Representative Rep. Maxine Waters in July 2009. Id. at ¶ 49.; See also Elazabeth
Broomfield, Survey: Subduing the Vultures: Assessing Government Caps on Recovery in Sovereign Debt Litigation,
2010 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 473 , 502‐10 (surveying legislation from Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the United
States aimed at limiting recoveries by non‐cooperating creditors). Moreover, countries such as Belgium have made
concentrated appeals to the World Bank and IMF to restrict creditor litigation in sovereign debt restructurings.
Broomfield at 10.
26
For a general summary of sovereign immunity in sovereign debt defaults, see Schumacher, Julian, Trebesch,
Christoph and Enderlein, Henrik, Sovereign Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976‐2010, 6‐9
(December 16, 2012), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189997 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2189997.
27
ARA Libertad (Argentina v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures Under
Article 209, Paragraph 5, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ¶¶ 3‐18, http://www.itlos.org.
28
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251‐52 (Oct. 26, 2012) (providing a brief summary of
Argentina’s restructuring, the passage of the Lock Law, and the hedge funds’ decision not to participate).
29
Agustino Fontevecchia, The Real Story of How a Hedge Fund Detained a Vessel in Ghana and Even Went for
Argentina’s ‘Air Force One’, Forbes, Oct. 5, 2012 (last accessed March 29, 2013 at 10:35am), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/10/05/the‐real‐story‐behind‐the‐argentine‐vessel‐in‐ghana‐
and‐how‐hedge‐funds‐tried‐to‐seize‐the‐presidential‐plane/ (“Back in 2007, a group of bondholders discovered
that the Tango 01, Argentina’s presidential airplane, would be in the U.S. for scheduled maintenance and pilot
training” . . . and “moved to get a court to keep the plane grounded after it landed . . . .”). See also H.C., Argentina
and Its Creditors: A Languid Tango, The Economist Blog, (Jan 16, 2013) (last accessed March 28th, 2013 at 10:14
am), available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2013/01/argentina‐and‐its‐creditors. (noting
that since the seizure of the Libertad in Ghana, the Argentine government has been renting a corporate jet for
three months in response to the “aggressive posture of the vulture funds with Argentina”).
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leave substantial funds parked in the United States,30 and able to demur collections actions in its
own courts, Argentina made this collection phase of the victorious plaintiffs a difficult one.31
Undiscouraged, NML doggedly pursued Argentina for assets abroad, from Belgian
diplomatic accounts to a colorful attempt on the presidential helicopter, Tango 1.32 It’s not that
this aggressive style should offend our wilting-violet sensibilities; on the contrary, lawyers
should be happy to create full employment for The Brotherhood. The issue is that, especially
given the positive reinforcement the funds received for their holdout conduct with Peru,33 it is
difficult to reject the hypothesis that their relentless strategy is animated more by a complex
signaling game of pit-bulledness, designed to make it clear that they are here and here to stay and
so a defaulting sovereign ought just to cough up and pay them off.
Consider in this regard the detention of the Libertad in Ghana.34 The fund successfully
arrested the vessel and brought it within the jurisdiction of the Ghanaian court.35 Although
Argentina was ultimately able to prevail on a sovereign immunity defense (slow as she is, the
Libertad is still a warship that enjoys the traditional immunity accorded such property under
international law),36 it was not a costless defense. And that’s precisely the problem – the fund

30
31

Luke Eric Peterson, Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Pile Up, but Investors Still Wait for a Payout, LAW.COM
(June 25, 2009) (last visited March 29, 2013 at 6:42pm), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202431736731&thepage=1&slreturn=20130229
183938.
32
Fontevecchia, supra n. 33.
33
Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring,
53 Emory L.J. 1043, 1045 ( 2004).
34
Fontevecchia, supra n. 33.
35
Fontevecchia, supra n. 33.
36
Buque Escuela, Armada Argentina, Minesterio de Defensa Presidencia de la Nacion, available at
http://www.armada.mil.ar/pag.asp?idItem=299 (last accessed March 29, 2013 at 10:20am) (describing the
Libertad, a frigate in service since 1963, as having a max speed of 13.5 knots.); Compare with the USS Missouri (BB‐
63), The Ship, Battleship Missouri Memorial Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, available at
http://www.ussmissouri.com/page.aspx?pid=590 (last accessed March 29, 2013 at 10:23am) (describing the USS
Missouri, a battleship launched in 1944, as having a max speed of 33 knots); See ARA Libertad (Argentina v.
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was willing to travel halfway around the world to arrest a vessel that in a best case scenario
would have netted it 1% of its outstanding claim.37 True, ninety-nine more ships later the fund
might have been made whole, but the jarring disconnect between the value of the claim and the
legal effort involved in seizing such a remote asset raises the question whether NML was doing it
just to posture for its larger holdout game.
As an aside, you may wonder what’s wrong with posturing? After all, if the funds are
willing to pay for the lawyers to gain what they perceive is a tactical advantage, then that’s just
more good news for The Brotherhood, isn’t it? The analysis may be more complex. When
private litigants invoke the international machinery of dispute resolution there are costs well
beyond the filing fees. When NML secured the attachment from the Ghanaian court, Argentina
had to initiate a proceeding under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”), a treaty finally completed in 1982 to resolve maritime disputes, to resolve its
claim of immunity.38 Although it expressed willingness to arbitrate, Argentina also had to seek

Ghana), Case No. 20, Order of Dec. 15, 2012, ¶ 98, http://www.itlos.org (highlighting the consideration “that
actions taken by the Ghanaian authorities that prevent the ARA Libertad, a warship belonging to the Argentine
Navy, from discharging its mission and duties affect the immunity enjoyed by this warship under general
international law”).
37
Jacob Goldstein, Why A Hedge Fund Seized An Argentine Navy Ship In Ghana, NPR Planet Money, October 22,
2012 (last accessed March 29, 2013 at 10:30am), available at
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2012/10/22/163384810/why‐a‐hedge‐fund‐seized‐an‐argentine‐navy‐ship‐in‐
ghana . (remarking that the Ghanaian court ordering the Libertad’s detention would have allowed the ship’s
release if Argentina posted a $20 million dollar bond).
38
Letter from Hector Timerman, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Argentine Republic, to Philippe
Gautier, Registrar of International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Sept. 11, 2012, available at
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20‐Request_for_official_website.pdf;
Request for The Prescription of Provisional Measures Under Article 290, Paragraph 5, of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, (Nov. 14, 2012), available at
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20‐Request_for_official_website.pdf; The
Tribunal, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=15.

9
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“provisional measures” to address the injunctive detention of her frigate.39 This required
convening the rarely deployed International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”).40
The ITLOS has convened only twenty-odd times throughout its lifetime.41 Looking at the
sorts of disputes it tends to hear, one sees such matters as seized fishing vessels due to capacious
claims of exclusive economic zones.42 Nominally, Argentina’s beef was with Ghana,43 but it is
clear to any observer that Argentina had to sue a private investment fund to get its own naval
ship back. It is not the obscurity of the tribunal on its own that is problematic; it is the fact that
empanelling these tribunals has costs. Yes, some costs can be passed onto the parties,44 but there
are myriad indirect costs that cannot. And when private parties can force the convening of
tribunals that were themselves the result of delicate compromises of wary nations forging
unsteady alliances in an international treaty, it can cheapen the broader field of international
conflict resolution. Skeptical nations (note that the United States has still to ratify the

39

Letter from Hector Timerman, Minister of ForeignAffairs and Worship of the Argentine Republic, to Philippe
Gautier, Registrar of International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Sept. 11, 2012, available at
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20‐Request_for_official_website.pdf;
Request for The Prescription of Provisional Measures Under Article 290, Paragraph 5, of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, (Nov. 14, 2012), available at
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20‐Request_for_official_website.pdf.
40
List of Cases, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=35 (listing only
twenty‐one cases in the Tribunal’s history).
41
Id.
42
See, e.g., (the “Monte Confurco” case) (Seychelles v. France), Case No. 6, Judgment of December 18, 2000,
ITLOS Rep. 2000, ¶¶ 27‐30.
43
Letter from Hector Timerman, Minister of ForeignAffairs and Worship of the Argentine Republic, to Philippe
Gautier, Registrar of International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Sept. 11, 2012, available at
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20‐Request_for_official_website.pdf;
Request for The Prescription of Provisional Measures Under Article 290, Paragraph 5, of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, (Nov. 14, 2012), available at
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20‐Request_for_official_website.pdf; The
Tribunal, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=15.
44
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex VI, ¶ 34, December 10, 1982 (“Unless otherwise
decided by the Tribunal, each party shall bear its own costs.”).
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UNCLOS)45 can point to such spectacles to say, “See, if we sign on we could get sued by some
crazy hedge fund.” It also forces public confrontation among nation states at the behest of
private parties (e.g., Argentina had to sue Ghana, a country with which it was experiencing
perfectly cordial relations).46
These costs make it difficult to dismiss the convening of the ITLOS as harmless and fully
internalized conduct. On the contrary, it shows that vulture funds’ litigious impulses can have
real and serious adverse consequences. If that is so, the primary reason for which they initiate
such international actions, namely, to gain leverage in their holdout negotiations, must be reanalyzed through the lens of cost-imposition onto other actors.
*

*

*

Taking these two propositions together—the incentive for vulture fund holdout and the
amenability of those funds to initiate litigation to assist their holdout strategy—we should predict
a high number of vulture fund lawsuits in sovereign debt restructurings. Whether we actually see
that, though, is unclear, because available evidence suggests that much sovereign debt is
restructured with minimal acrimony.47 That said, the trend line is worrisome according to the

45

Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements
As of 23 January 2013, UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, (Jan. 23, 2013).
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
46
See Ghana To Ensure Release of Argentine Navy Ship, Government of Ghana Official Website, Dec. 17, 2012 at
8:05, (last visited March 29, 2012), available at http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/news/general‐news/18548‐
ghana‐to‐ensure‐release‐of‐argentine‐navy‐ship (noting the government’s statements that “[i]t is pertinent to
recall that the arrest of the Argentine vessel arises from a dispute between Argentina and a private foreign
company” . . . and the “Government of Ghana has always maintained that it does not consider itself to be in
dispute with Argentina”) (emphasis added).
47
MONETARY AND CAPITAL MARKETS DEP’T OF THE INT’L MONETARY FUND, A SURVEY OF EXPERIENCES WITH EMERGING MARKET
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS 11 (2012) (noting that the number of litigated cases remains low, participation rates
remain high, and bond restructurings have generally been faster than restructurings with banks).
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recent empirical data.48 Moreover, even if the absolute litigation rate is low, the relative one is
high;49 that is, even if there’s not a lot of litigation out there yet, when there is litigation, the
vulture funds are frequently present, and their rising prevalence in holding publicly issued
sovereign debt predicts a worsening of the problem.
Indeed, it is the still-relative infrequency of litigation that ironically exacerbates the
negative influence of vulture funds. The problem is because there is such a thin precedent book,
there’s no comfort zone of relevant case law for judges to fall back upon when presented with a
legal challenge by such a tenacious litigant. Judges are nevertheless asked to make important
policy decisions in one-off interventions that occur every few years, a task to which they are
poorly suited. The litigiousness of vulture funds exacerbates this problem.50 As the funds
become increasingly emboldened to start lawsuits all around the world, they are dragging the
enforcement of sovereign debt into the courtrooms rather than the halls of the IMF.51 Judges
can’t hide from these cases, and there is no reason to believe vulture funds will drop their
lawsuits without having succeeded in extorting a higher payout.
Doubtless stemming from this lack of experience and familiarity, courts of general
jurisdiction— at least in the United States— can botch things up. The widespread criticism of the
NML v. Argentina proceedings provides a case in point.52 Indeed, the court at several times was

48

Julian Schumacher, Chrisoph Trebesch, Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor
Litigation 1976‐2010, at 3 (December 16, 2012), Working Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2189997 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2189997. (“Compared to the 1980s, the likelihood that a debt crisis is accompanied
by creditor litigation has more than doubled in recent years, to more than 30% in the 2000s.”).
49
MONETARY AND CAPITAL MARKETS DEP’T OF THE INT’L MONETARY FUND, A SURVEY OF EXPERIENCES WITH EMERGING MARKET
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS 1, 12 (2012) (noting that “creditor coordination and holdouts have not generally
been a problem”).
50
Id. at 12.
51
Id.
52
; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK, 31 (2013); Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Debt after NML v. Argentina, 8 CAP. MKTS.

12
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/81

12

Pottow:

at pains to point out it would be much better if there was an organized collective proceeding, like
a bankruptcy, to resolve the dispute,53 almost as if it resented having to adjudicate a restructuring
through the agenda-setting of one creditor. For those jurisdictions without specialized
insolvency or business tribunals, confronting sovereign debt problems in the posture of a general
civil action for breach of contract is especially awkward.54
In the NML case, a striking example of the lack of familiarity shown to matters of debt
default comes from the Second Circuit and SDNY’s treatment of the pari passu clause with
Argentina.55 As discussed already above, the most troubling policy outcome with this case is the
perverse holdout incentive it creates by paying the holdouts more than the cooperators. Brushing
aside the concerns of the United States as Amicus curiae, the lower court expressed mystification
as to why there was a holdout problem at all: any “holding out,” it reasoned, was largely a
consequence of Argentina’s staunch refusal to make payment on its defaulted bonds, not the
recalcitrance of the vulture funds.56 If you just capitulated and paid, implied the court, you
wouldn’t have a holdout problem anymore(!).

L. J. 123 (2013). Cf. Romain Zamour, NML v. Argentina and the Ratable Payment Interpretation of the Pari Passu
Clause, 38 Yale L.J. 55, 55‐56 (2013) (“When the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Griesa’s orders, many
commentators announced the end of sovereign debt restructuring as we know it.”) (arguing that this widespread
“alarmist interpretation” is unwarranted).
53
Amended February 23, 2012 Order, at 3‐4 NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (Nov. 21, 2012) (08 Civ. 6978
TPG) (“The public interest of enforcing contracts and upholding the rule of law will be served by the issuance of
this Order, particularly here, where creditors of the Republic have no recourse to bankruptcy regimes to protect
their interests and must rely upon courts to enforce contractual promises.”), available at
http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/Arg5‐Order‐112112.pdf.
54
Commercial List in Toronto, Ontario Courts, Superior Court of Justice (last visited March 29, 2013 at 11:50),
available at http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/en/notices/pd/toronto/commercial_list_2010.htm (“Established in
Toronto in 1991, the Commercial List is comprised of a team of judges who have experience in managing complex
commercial litigation.”).
55
See NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 257‐61 (2d Cir. 26, 2012).
56
NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 263‐65 (2d Cir. 26, 2012) (“Nor will the district's court's
judgment have the practical effect of enabling ‘a single creditor to thwart the implementation of an internationally
supported restructuring plan”’ . . . as “[i]t is up to the sovereign—not ‘any single creditor’—whether it will
repudiate that creditor’s debt in a manner that violates a pari passu clause.”)
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Bracketing for the moment whether the court was serious in this comment (there is more
to this case than meets the eye),57 let’s assume, just for sake of argument, the court really thought
there was not a holdout problem afoot. That’s astonishing. Saying they’ll go away if you just
pay them a bit more than all the others is what a holdout problem is. Accordingly, if we take the
court at its word— that it really doesn’t see any holdout problem— then we have a vivid
illustration of generalist courts that don’t see lots of bankruptcy actions “getting it wrong,”
relying upon reasoning most steeped in bankruptcy law would consider absurd.58
As such, the real problem of private enforcement of sovereign debt by vulture funds is
not just the gratuitous invocation of international judicial apparatuses, but the development of a
lurching, disorganized, ad hoc casebook of judicial precedent on sovereign debt, all spun out by
busy jurists who have little expertise on the subject matter. That leads to bad legal outcomes, or
at the very least naïve legal outcomes.59 Worse, if the merits of the NML case are allowed to
stand, the incentive for these holdouts has just increased astronomically, auguring a worsening of
the trend.60 (The fallout in the sovereign debt market has been panic-stricken; even the IMF has

57

As the exasperated judges of the Second Circuit complained, Argentina’s conduct has hardly instilled confidence
in the rule of law and the vindication of commercial expectations. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., No.
03 Civ. 8845 (TPG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99502, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The difficulties involved result solely from
the failure of the Republic to honor its legal obligations in a normal, direct manner.”).
58
I don’t want to pick on the NML courts too much. Indeed, there is repeated reference to the true problem being
the lack of a CAC. See, e.g., NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 253‐65 (5th[?] Cir. 2012).
59

One hastens to jump on the bandwagon criticizing the opinion – I’ll leave the United States as Amicus
Curiae to carry that charge. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Reversal at 1‐4, NML Capital, LTD. v. Banco Cent. de la Republica Arg., 652 F.3d 172 (2011) (Nos. 10‐
1487‐cv(L), 10‐1488‐cv(CON), 10‐1493‐cv (CON), 10‐1507‐cv(CON), 10‐1510‐cv(CON), 10‐1524‐cv(CON),
10‐1529‐cv(CON), 10‐1545‐cv(CON), 10‐1603‐cv(CON), 10‐1629‐cv(CON)). – but to give an idea of the
depth of the academic opposition, consider W. Mark C. Wedemaier, Sovereign Debt After NML v.
Argentina, Capital Markets L J. (discussing pari passu clause interpretation as jarringly ahistorical and
contrary to widespread international interpretation).
60

Be careful what I wish for: I could get the very field of jurisprudence for which I purportedly long.
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fretted that NML will “give holdout creditors greater leverage.”)61 This concern doesn’t even get
into the problem of potentially conflicting judgments from different tribunals on, e.g., the proper
contractual interpretation of a given clause in a bond issuance (although the choice of law and
forum clauses help mute that problem somewhat, albeit it at the cost of concentrating it all on
New York law, as now interpreted by the Second Circuit). Leaving aside political viability, one
benefit from a SDRM framework would at the least be an evolving coherent jurisprudence,
something the unfolding status quo inhibits.62
Accordingly, sovereign debt restructuring faces a continued and ongoing problem of how
to deal with holdouts, even in an age of the CAC. The presence of vulture funds crystallizes this
theoretical potential in a way that has not just the direct negative consequence of the holdout qua
holdout, but of the indirect problems stemming from a robust litigation appetite that leads to the
inappropriate use of a fragile international legal framework and the development of a potentially
disruptive ad hoc book of legal precedent in domestic courts. The time is thus ripe for privatefund-directed reform.
III.

An International Certification Board for Sovereign Debt Restructuring.

Before turning to the certification board proposal, we must pause to ask whether the
forgoing discussion has proved too much. That is, if all these evils with vulture funds are so,
then why not return to the ever-beckoning bandwagon and join the policy proposals that seek to

61

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK, 31 (2013). See also Anna Gelpern, Italy’s Pari Passu Scrubbing, CREDIT SLIPS (April 17,
2013 12:17 AM) http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/.
62
David A. Skeel, Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It All?, 52 Emory L.J. 417, 421 (2003) (noting that the potential
for “thriving good faith jurisprudence withered on the vine” after majority voting provisions, such as CACs, became
obsolete for U.S. corporations following Congress’s codification of a large scale corporate reorganization
framework in the 1930s). See also Patrick Bolton and David A. Skeel, Inside the Black Box: How Should a Sovereign
Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 Emory L.J. 763 (2004).
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curtail the rights of these funds to sue for private enforcement of sovereign debt upon default?63
After all, the simplest and most direct solution to a perceived danger of vulture fund litigation
would surely be to clamp down on such lawsuits directly. If the market doesn’t do so itself (with
the promulgation of litigation-vote clauses or vesting litigation powers in indenture trustees),
there are plentiful ways this could be done by the state: buffing up immunity doctrines,
resurrection of champerty laws, etc.
The problem is overdeterrence. Sometimes these funds do provide a valuable
monitoring function, as others before have eloquently demonstrated.64 Consider for a recent
example the healthy role of vulture funds in the recent private-law insolvency case of Vitro in
Mexico.65 Although Vitro was a private company, it was a big enough player that analysis of the
case within a discussion of sovereign debt is not inappropriate. In Vitro,66 the Mexican company
proposed a concurso plan that sought to cut around half the bondholder debt but allow equity to
retain much of its interest.67 It did so pursuant to a majority vote of creditors, but those creditors
included inter-company obligations (allegedly manufactured by the debtor to gerrymander the
vote), including the debts of solvent debtor subsidiaries that would have their guarantees to the

63

See supra, Part II.
See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 53 Emory L.J. 1043, 1046 ( 2004) (“Holdout creditors, by refusing to participate in restructurings of
sovereign debt, serve as a check on opportunistic defaults and onerous restructuring terms, . . . may limit collusive
behavior among the majority of creditors,” . . . and may “promote the functioning of the international capital
markets.”).
65
I did some paid legal work in the Vitro case, so my analysis in the text above should perhaps be tempered by this
disclosure. Then again, now that that legal work is informing my scholarship, maybe I should claim any
unreimbursed expenses in that consulting from my academic research account at the university! (I hereby dub this
type of argument an “ethical double‐down.”)
66
See In re Vitro S.A.B. de C.V., 473 B.R. 117 (Bank N.D. Tex. June 13, 2012), aff’d, 701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. Nov. 28,
2012),
67
See Ad Hoc Grp. of Vitro Noteholders v. Vitro SAB de CV (In re Vitro SAB de CV), 701 F.3d 1031, 1036‐1040 (5th
Cir. 2012).
64
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bondholders extinguished.68 There, it was investment consortia—including vulture funds—that
blew the whistle and challenged the Mexican proceedings in U.S. court.69 (Actually, per the
previous observations on vulture fund litigation appetite, they did so everywhere—Mexico, the
U.S., both state and federal court70—you name it.)
Particularly telling in that case was how the Mexican debtor tried to demonize the funds.
For example, it argued that the bondholders shouldn’t whine about their treatment under
Mexican law because some of them, like vulture funds, bought the debt at a steep discount well
after default.71 Yet the funds were ultimately vindicated, from bankruptcy court up to the Fifth
Circuit,72 true to the predictions of those who say these investment funds can serve an important
monitoring function, whether through policing debtor misconduct or exposing behavior that
tramples on the rights of minority stakeholders. The funds in Vitro protected significant value for
retail and other investors. As mentioned, Vitro is not a sovereign case (at least not nominally,
although there was apparently some dispute about the extent to which Mexican governmental
thumbs were on the scales). Still, it serves as a stark illustration of the “good” side of vulture
funds: scrappy litigants who won’t roll over when told that “that’s just the way the law works
over here.” This is wholly in addition to the market-facilitating role some say they serve in
simply speeding things along by entering and then exiting an investment contingent on

68

Id. at 1037, 1067.
Id. at 1040.
70
Id.
71
Supplemental Opening Brief of Appellant Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., In re Vitro, 701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. Sept. 28, 2012)
(No. 12‐10689), 2012 WL 4839064 at 25 (stating that the appellee creditors are “sophisticated distressed debt
investment funds that took a calculated and ultimately unsuccessful risk that they could obtain greater profits by
purchasing Old Notes at a discount” and are now “using them to block Vitro SAB’s restructuring”).
72
See In re Vitro, 701 F.2d at 1069‐1070.
69
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confirmation of a plan: if they have an exit strategy, they will keep the pressure on for plan
confirmation.73
Reconsidering Argentina, we must ask ourselves which narrative applies. On the one
hand, a picture has been painted of a voracious litigant willing to take matters all the way to the
high seas to hunt down extraterritorial assets of a defaulting sovereign. But on the other hand,
Argentina’s recalcitrance is well known.74 In fact, even under the well-respected regime of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSD”)75— where all sorts of
countries who are hardly poster children for the rule of law cough up awards— Argentina has
steadfastly refused to pay when losing (on the theory that no-one has come to Argentina and
asked to domesticate such an award).76 The Lock Law and its suspension hardly evince a
willingness to negotiate with remaining creditors, and the senior governmental officials’
repeated, almost gleeful announcements that they have no intention whatsoever of paying any
old debtholders seems verging on anarchic, especially in light of the country’s improved
economic circumstances and payment ability.77 Were this a question of odious debt,78 different

73

Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring,
53 Emory L.J. 1043, 1047 (2004).
74
Luke Eric Peterson, Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Pile Up, but Investors Still Wait for a Payout, LAW.COM
(June 25, 2009) (last visited March 29, 2013 at 6:42pm), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202431736731&thepage=1&slreturn=20130229
183938. (noting that even after a ICSID ordered Argentina to pay $133.2 million to an ICSID award‐holder,
Argentina refused saying that award‐holders “should bring the award to an Argentine court for recognition and
enforcement”).
75

ICSID recently determined, for the first time, that it has jurisdiction to hear sovereign default claims
under a Bilateral Investment Treaty. Abaclat and Others v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissability, ¶ 713 (August 4, 2011). See also See Jessica Beess
und Chrostin, Note, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Mass Claims Arbitration before the ICSID, The
Abaclat Case, 53 Harv. Int'l L.J. 505 (2012), available at http://www.harvardilj.org/wp‐
content/uploads/2010/05/HLI206.pdf (noting that Abaclat is the first case of its kind). It is possible that
the use of international arbitration to resolve sovereign debt disputes will increase as a result.
76
Peterson, supra n. 82.
77

NML Capital v. Argentina, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168292 at *8‐9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012) (“From the moment of
the October 26, 2012 Court of Appeals' decision, the highest officials in Argentina have declared that Argentina
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moral concerns might be engaged,79 but Argentina seems to take the position that her
intransigence is pour encourager les autres not to hold out: NML had its chance, got greedy, and
so now has to pay the price.80
Judge Griesa’s exasperation with the Republic is thinly veiled and drips from the pages of
the Federal Reporter.81 This anger harkens back to the prior point of whether he really doesn’t
think there’s a holdout problem in this case. An alternative and equally likely interpretation is
that the judge thinks that any holdout problem is trivial in comparison to the flagrant contempt
for legal process, including his own orders, shown by Argentina.82 This view would be
consistent with a narrative that frames Argentina less as the victim of voracious ship-scavenging
vultures and more as abusive, Vitro-like (vitreous?) juggernauts stampeding over the rights of
creditors. The question, then, for a proposal to change the sovereign debt collection system is

would pay the exchange bond‐holders but would not pay one dollar to holders of the original FAA Bonds” . . . and .
. . “[t]he Minister of Economy, Lorenzino, declared that despite any ruling to come out of any jurisdiction,
Argentina would not pay the FAA bondholders.”) (emphasis added).
78
See Robert K. Rasmussen, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Odious Debt, and the Politics of Debt Relief, 70 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 249, 249 (2007) ( “The central intuition [behind odious debt] is that the citizens of a country
should not have to pay for the debts incurred by a prior “odious” regime when those funds did not benefit these
citizens.”). See also Lee c. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati, and Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56
Duke L.J. 1201, 1218 (2007) (summarizing Alexander Sack’s 1927 formulation of odious debt as sovereign lending
that is (1) “contracted by a despotic power,” (2) “for a purpose that is not in the general interests or needs of the
state,” and that (3) “the lender knows that the proceeds of the debt will not benefit the nation as a whole”).
79
See Arturo C. Porzecanski, When Bad Things Happen to Good Sovereign Debt Contracts: The Case of Ecuador, 73
Law & Contemp. Probs. 251, 256 (2010) (describing Ecuador’s choice to default on its loans, which likely could have
been repaid, when the then populist Ecuadorian government declared the sovereign bonds “immoral and
illegitimate”).
80
See Agustino Fontevecchia, The Real Story of How a Hedge Fund Detained a Vessel In Ghana and Even Went for
Argentina’s ‘Air Force One’, Forbes.com, available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/10/05/the‐real‐story‐behind‐the‐argentine‐vessel‐in‐ghana‐
and‐how‐hedge‐funds‐tried‐to‐seize‐the‐presidential‐plane/
81
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
82
Argentina’s flagrant comments that it would contravene any negative outcome it receives in the New York
federal courts undoubtedly only poured more gas on Griesa’s inflamed concern over Argentina’s defiance. Judge
Griesa noted: “For the past ten years, Argentina has repeatedly submitted matters to the District Court and the
Court of Appeals, and received what was undoubtedly fair treatment, since Argentina prevailed in most matters.”
Id. If Argentina did not back away from these “ill‐advised threats,” he continued, Argentina’s defiance would “not
only be illegal but would represent the worst kind of irresponsibility in dealing with the judiciary.” Id. (emphasis
added).
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how to decide whether a vulture fund is being “good” or being “bad.” Judge Griesa clearly
thought NML was being good (or, perhaps more accurately, better than Argentina),83 but what
are we to make with his seemingly poor familiarity with the concept of a holdout problem?
The conceit of this article is to try to offer a new proposal that captures the good side of
fund behavior but curbs its bad side. Great work has been done already in this area offering
reform proposals,84 and so the additional contribution of this article is modest. It is also mindful
of the pragmatic and political impediments to some of these theoretically attractive proposals,
such as the SDRM. (If it was a good idea in the early 2000s, it’s an even better idea now post
(intra?) Great Recession.) The IMF, for example, has previously noted the theoretical
attractiveness of the SDRM, stating that it “preserves the economic value of assets and facilitates
a return to medium-term viability, and thereby reduces the costs of the restructuring process” and
“should also be expected to improve the functioning of the capital markets.”85 The Fund has
recently been forced to concede, however, that the proposal “received considerable support
within the Board, but failed to command the majority needed to amend the Fund’s Article of
Agreement due to the members’ reluctance to surrender the degree of sovereignty required to
establish such a framework.”86 Accordingly, the time has come for modest innovation to move
down the road to SDRM but recognize the reality that that destination is a long way off.

83

See NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 263‐64(5th Cir. 26, 2012).
See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 53 Emory L.J. 1043 ( 2004); A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 53 Emory L. J. 997 (2004); David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It All?, 52 Emory L.J.
417 (2003); Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 Int’l Law. 103 (2003); Steven L.
Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 956 (2000);
Daniel K. Tarullo, Neither Order Nor Chaos: The Legal Structure of Sovereign Debt Workouts, 53 Emory L.J. 657
(2004); Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi‐Sovereign Debt. 121 Yale L.J. 888 (2012).
85
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, PROPOSED FEATURES OF A SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM 2 (2003).
86
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 12‐13 (2013).
84
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The preference for a more modest policy innovation than, for example, a supranational
sovereign debt insolvency tribunal is not a coward’s slide to second best. It is driven by a
sentiment akin to that expressed in Professor Tarullo’s article about the virtues of the unspecified
and the inchoate in international matters such as sovereign debt restructuring.87 Sometimes when
consensus is difficult to achieve, matters are best elided and left for a later day when resistance
may have changed. In this vein, it may actually be not all that bad that we don’t yet have an
SRDM. Maybe we’re just not ready for it yet. If so, then ad hoc incrementalism may be the best
recipe.88
Accordingly, given that the holdout problem is unlikely to be solved anytime soon by a
broadly adopted macro-level policy proposal (except maybe regionally—keep trying, Europe!),89
a different approach might be to try a much more modest next step: a Board of Certification for
sovereign debt restructuring proposals. The idea would be to give such a Board the power to
“bless” a sovereign’s proposal as generally complying with standards of procedural fairness and
minority protection, following kind of an aggregated customary international law of financial
default.90 It would do so in broad terms only and deliberately eschew getting into the details of
whether the absolute haircut demanded is too much (or not enough) for the creditors to bear. The
87

See Daniel K. Tarullo, Neither Order Nor Chaos: The Legal Structure of Sovereign Debt Workouts, 53 Emory L.J.
657 (2004). There is some evidence, however, that arbitrators may use precedent more, or at least differently,
than is commonly believed, in what has affectionately been called “judging‐lite.” Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging‐
Lite: How Arbitrators Use and Create Precedent, 90 N.C.L. Rev. 1091, 1092‐1094 (2012).
88
If the reader won’t gag at a self‐citation, this is a point I have made on cross‐border corporate debt
restructuring. JOHN A. E. POTTOW, PROCEDURAL INCREMENTALISM: A MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY (2005).
(advocating incremental reform efforts of procedural focus as first‐stage development of international business
laws).
89
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 37 (2013) (mentioning the possibility of a European Crisis Resolution Mechanism).
90
The Certification Board builds on prior proposals suggesting that sovereigns and creditors abide by a code of
conduct in their negotiations. See, e.g., BETRAND COUILLANT & PIERRE‐FRANCOIS WEBER, TOWARDS A VOLUNTARY CODE OF
GOOD CONDUCT FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 154 (2003). However, a Certification Board would go beyond
present proposals in that, rather than asking the parties to follow a code of conduct out of their own good
consciences, the Certification Board would play a monitoring and enforcing role (albeit only with the powers of
reputational constraints and extremely soft law).
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Board would thus be remedially toothless. For example, it would have no power to compel
compliance or resolve priority disputes. Those matters would have to await whatever judicial
processes the parties might choose to engage. To be sure, the Board could perhaps have rosters
of arbitrators that parties to a dispute related to the sovereign debt might avail themselves,91 but
the Board would be, by design, nonadjudicatory. The reason for this hobbling-by-design is that
international institutions tend to garner support in inverse proportion to the power they wield. In
this sense, the Board would occupy a middle ground between a statutory (SDRM) and marketbased (CAC) approach, with the atmospherics of the former but the party autonomy of the
latter.92
Just what could such a Board actually do, then? That is, if by design the Board is to be
defanged of any adjudicatory power, will it be able to have any relevance in the rough and
tumble state of nature of sovereign debt default? Tentative yes: the Board can have an impact.
First, it is worth noting that the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders and the Foreign
Bondholders Protective Council carried great weight in recommending settlements with U.K.
sovereign bondholders even though they had no authority to commit individual creditors to
anything.93 (They are surely inspirations for the Gitlin and House idea of a “Sovereign Debt
Forum” to facilitate inter-creditor communication.)94 The stamp of approval by a respected

91

Christoph G. Paulus, A Standing Arbitral Tribunal as a Procedural Solution for Sovereign Debt Restructurings, in
Sovereign Debt and the Financial Crisis: Will this Time be Different? 317‐327 (Carlos A. Primo Braga & Gallina A.
Vincelette, eds. 2011), available at http://www‐
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/12/07/000333037_20101207001919/Re
ndered/PDF/582830PUB0ID231n0Debt09780821384831.pdf.
92
The Code of Conduct, similar in spirit, has been called a “comprehensive, non‐statutory approach,” which might
be as good a label as any. BETRAND COUILLANT & PIERRE‐FRANCOIS WEBER, TOWARDS A VOLUNTARY CODE OF GOOD CONDUCT
FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 157 (2003).
93
Wediemar, Capital Markets paper at 8, citing sources at fn 16.
94
See Richard Gitlin and Brett House, A Renewed Proposal for a Sovereign Debt Forum (2013), available at
http://www.sauvescholars.org/uploads/A%20Renewed%20Proposal%20for%20a%20Sovereign%20Debt%20Forum
%20‐%2027Mar2013.pdf.
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entity can carry great weight in the investment world. Second, the Board can also have an impact
even with more litigiously inclined investors. Consider that the chief role the Board could play
is that its non-binding declarations of restructuring proposals being compliant (or non-compliant)
with generally fair treatment of creditors could then be relied upon by non-expert, generalist
judges in later domestic court proceedings who might be called upon to exercise judicial
discretion. In systems that accord such judges wide discretion (e.g., perhaps arrest of a foreign
vessel is a discretionary form of relief a libellant might seek, not an automatic right), that
discretion can then be exercised in the light of knowing whether the sovereign has been playing
fair or not and, by implication, whether the private party litigant, which we’ll assume is a vulture
fund, is a presumptive holdout. Creditors fighting such a “board-certified” restructuring can of
course never be deprived of their pre-existing contractual and property rights; that would require
some binding legal authority, such as a sovereign bankruptcy code, which is still quite some way
off. But they will have to seek whatever legal relief they do want as either participants or nonparticipants in a board-certified (or uncertified) proceeding, with all the attendant atmospheric
baggage that that status might entail.
To offer just one example, the certification proposal is a kindred spirit to the idea of
“plain vanilla” financial products to be regulated by the new Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”) in the United States.95

Heterogeneous financial products are still permitted

with few outright bans, but some that receive an administrative seal of approval will be protected
by more favorable legal treatment. The comparison is not perfect, however, because the lack of
95

See About Us, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the‐
bureau/ (last visited March 30, 2013 at 2:14pm) (describing the CFPB’s mission as making “markets for consumer
financial products and services work for Americans—whether they are applying for a mortgage, choosing among
credit cards, or using any number of other consumer financial products”); see also Michael B. Mierzewski, Beth S.
DeSimone, Jeremy W. Hochberg, and Brian P. Larkin, The Dodd‐Frank Act Establishes the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection As the Primary Regulator Of Consumer Financial Products And Services, 127 Banking L.J. 722
(2010) (providing an overview of the CFPB and its role in the regulation of consumer financial products).
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a SDRM or other mechanism to provide firm legal consequences (be they carrots or sticks) for
certification means that a certification’s punch will necessarily be less significant than, for
example, being a “qualified residential mortgage” by the CFBP,96 but it’s a start for an
international world.97 In fact, this lack of strong compulsive power might be seen as a cognate to
the denuded authority a U.S. bankruptcy judge holds in a chapter 9 bankruptcy proceeding (for
municipal and other public debtors).98 Thus, the fact that certifications cannot “force” any legal
outcome just means they are yet another form of soft—very soft—international law (perhaps
even soft non-law?). But the international realm has long countenanced degrees of hardness in
legal reforms,99 and so international lawyers, one hopes, can readily anticipate certification by a
respected board carrying some non-trivial weight. (Moreover, wholly apart from the certification
itself is the process: the Board’s procedure in reviewing a workout proposal will facilitate the
transparent exchange of information and dialogue – hugely important requirements for efficient
resolution of sovereign financial distress.)
The tougher question is even if, in the abstract, a certification could exert some softest of
soft law effect on commercial actors, what about vulture funds, with their hardnosed litigation
appetite? Will the vultures just thumb their beaks at its pronouncements? The quick answer is
96

Ability‐to‐Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg.
20, 6408 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt 1026) (“The Dodd‐Frank Act provides that ‘qualified
mortgages’ are entitled to a presumption that the creditor making the loan satisfied the ability‐to‐repay
requirements,” which provide that a mortgage lender must first “consider consumers’ ability to repay home loans
before extending them credit.”).
97
Cf. Marie Visot, Cyrille Lachèvre, and Anne Cheyvialle, Three Solutions to the Euro Zone Crisis, Le Figaro.fr
(Brenna M. T. Daldorph, trans.) (Jan. 12, 2011, 5:48 p.m.), http://plus.lefigaro.fr/note/three‐solutions‐to‐the‐euro‐
crisis‐20111201‐616031 (quoting one of the authors of the red‐ and blue‐debt Eurozone scheme and summarizing
the idea and dividing the public debts of each Eurozone country into two with the blue debt—considered senior
and set a maximum of 60% GDP—always reimbursed first and the red debt—considered junior and compromising
the debt going beyond 60% GDP—covered by the separate countries).
98
Chapter 9: Municipality Bankruptcy, United States Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter9.aspx (last visited March 30, 2012
at 3:10 pm) (describing a bankruptcy court’s limited powers pursuant to Sections 903 and 904).
99
See generally Michael Reisman, The Concept and Functions of Soft Law in International Politics, in ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF JUDGE TASLIM OLAWALE ELIAS (Emmanuel G. Bello and Bola A. Ajibola, eds. 1992).
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we won’t know ‘til we try it. But we can have theoretical predictions, and even admitting the
need for speculation, there is reason to believe there is a chance for impact. The basis for this
optimism is the degree to which the current system substantially requires the exercise of
discretionary judicial power.100 Even if funds are impervious to norms, they do respect power.
Already a suspicious class of plaintiffs, vulture funds will surely appreciate their disadvantaged
status walking into court as opponents of a “board-certified” sovereign debt restructuring
proposal.
Consider, indeed, the injunction as the quintessential equitable request at AngloAmerican law. Assume that Judge Griesa had been confronted with injunction requests from
NML after the hypothetical Board of Certification had approved the Argentine proposal as a
legitimate conciliation of debts that 93% of creditors had gone along with it. While he may have
come out the exact same way in his ruling, it is also possible that the creditors’ then-exposed
recalcitrance would make him view Argentina’s own intransigence against these creditors in a
different light. In fact, taking an innovative tool from U.S. bankruptcy law, an injunctiondeciding judge might even adopt a reverse-injunction rule and enjoin holdout creditor collection
actions until after creditors accepting haircuts are paid under a board-certified proposal.101 This
sort of “channeling injunction” sometimes used in U.S. mass-tort cases would be a way of
designing a judicial hotchpot rule of the sort being considered by some reformers.102 A judge

100

[
See 11 U.S.C. s. 508 (implementing common law hotchpot rule).
102
See Eric D. Green, James L. Patton, Edwin J. Harron, Future Claimant Trusts and “Channeling Injunctions” To
Resolve Mass Tort Environmental Liability In Bankruptcy: The Met‐Coil Model, 22 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 157, 161‐62
(2005) (describing how a bankruptcy court can use a channeling injunction to satisfy the competing aims of “(1)
providing companies with a comprehensive resolution of their abilities and (2) protecting the interests of future
claimants” by channeling “future claims not subject to discharge away from the debtor (and potentially the
debtor’s affiliates and insurers) into a trust that resolves the claims for future claimants”). See also In re Johns‐
Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 626 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (applying a channeling injunction in a situation where the
debtor faced a flood of current and future asbestos‐related litigation). Actually, the channeling would have the
101
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worried about going out on a limb with such an innovation could always cite the existence of a
certification as a comity-based justification for extraordinary judicial cooperation. (On the other
side of the restructuring ledger – what would motivate a sovereign to seek board approval? – the
worries are slighter. Sovereign debtors will fear market punishment, and there’s always the stick
of IMF conditionality that could conceivably be brandished.)103
As for who should staff such a Board, presumable starting candidates might be the IMF
or even World Bank, although there may be political reasons why they might be undesirable
choices.104 The UN— more specifically, UNCITRAL— might be another possibility. ICSID is
another candidate. In contrast to the proposals of others who want to decentralize control onto
the several states of the world,105 this proposal embraces centralization, piggybacking off the
reputation of some hoary international body, all the while making clear that the ensuing Board
would have no adjudicatory capabilities.106 (Technocrats are preferable to politicians.)

effect of subordinating the holdouts claim, which implicates the different kettle of equitable subordination fish,
but that’s another topic.
103
This is what the Code of Conduct supporters recommended. BETRAND COUILLANT & PIERRE‐FRANCOIS WEBER,
TOWARDS A VOLUNTARY CODE OF GOOD CONDUCT FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 160 (2003).
104
The IMF and the World Bank have both been criticized (and praised) for their alleged pro‐Western bias and their
support of U.S. Strategic Interests. See, e.g., Bribing Allies: The IMF and the World Bank Become Part of America’s
Anti‐Terrorist Arsenal, The Economist, Sept. 29, 2001, available at http://www.economist.com/node/800160
(noting various political uses of the IMF and the World Bank and the influence held over both organizations by the
United States, but concluding that “such political decisions come at a price: they undermine the Fund’s credibility
as a purely economic institution”).
105
See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Comment on Universal Proceduralism, 48 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 503, FNs. 33,
44 (2010) (stating that dispute resolution should in some respects be decentralized because “local processing of
claims addresses legitimate concerns that local creditors, especially consumers and other small creditors, cannot
effectively press their claims in a distant forum”); Patrick Bolton and David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How
Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured, 53 Emory L.J. 763, 809‐11 (2004) (proposing that
existing corporate bankruptcy courts should serve as the institutional decisionmakers for a new sovereign
insolvency framework).
106
Anne O. Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund at the National Economists’
Club Annual Members’ Dinner (Nov.26, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm) (providing the initial SDRM proposal) ; Sean Hagan,
Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 35 Geo. J. Int'l L. 299 (2005); Hal S. Scott, A
Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 Int’l Law. 103, 133‐35 (2003) (proposing an SDRM‐based
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The tougher question to address is selecting the criteria by which a proposal would be
rated for certification by the Board. One good initiative, from Governor Trichet, is the Code of
Conduct for sovereign debt restructuring.107 The Board could certify whether the proposal
complies with the Code of Conduct. In general, the idea is to keep the criteria as procedurally
and non-substantively focused as possible (straying far afield from those commentators who
suggest fixed haircuts be written into law as a substantive requirement imposed on creditors).108
Indeed, consider the criteria discussed in the Code of Conduct: matters such as whether the
creditors were accorded representation rights, including the formation of a committee; whether
the sovereign negotiated with stakeholders in good faith; etc.109 Borrowing just for sake of
argument some ideas from the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, it probably would not make sense to have
a “best interest test” analysis,110 which gauges what the creditors might get in a hypothetical
liquidation. But there can be analysis of basic procedural safeguards in the reorganization
context. This could take a page from the IMF’s playbook, which has upped its insistence on
permitting creditor representation with requiring “good-faith effort” to negotiate with creditors
(although qualifying that that can arise through informal consultation before a take-it-or-leave-it
offering – or a “non-negotiated offer” as the Fund prefers to call it).111

insolvency structure which would be administered by an international commission compromised by individuals
chosen from a list of certified experts agreed to in advance).
107
BETRAND COUILLANT & PIERRE‐FRANCOIS WEBER, TOWARDS A VOLUNTARY CODE OF GOOD CONDUCT FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING 154 (2003). But see Barry Herman, Why the Code of Conduct for Resolving Sovereign Debt Crises Falls
Short (Graduate Program in Int’l Affairs at The New Sch., Working Paper 2008‐02, 2008).
108
DANIEL GROS AND THOMAS MAYER, TOWARDS A EURO(PEAN) MONETARY FUND 4‐5 (2010)(criticizing the Code of Conduct
approach).
109
BETRAND COUILLANT & PIERRE‐FRANCOIS WEBER, TOWARDS A VOLUNTARY CODE OF GOOD CONDUCT FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING 157‐59 (2003).
110
11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(7) (setting forth the best interest test in chapter 11 proceedings).
111
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 11 (2013).
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Additionally, the Certification Board can decide whether there has been equal, nondiscriminatory treatment of creditors, although this is an area where sovereign debt departs from
purely private corporate debt restructuring. This last point is an area where some caution must be
exercised. Sovereign debt workouts often have differential treatment, as seen just recently with
the Seychelles and Belize. 112 Indeed, the Code of Conduct suggests public sector debt should be
outright disenfranchised if “directly or indirectly owned or controlled by the sovereign issuer and
its public sector,” which makes sense given the different stakes involved.113 This is an area still
in some flux, though: The IIF Principles at first suggested that private creditors should not be
asked to restructures their debt without buy-in from public bilateral creditors to share the pain –
which the IMF in characteristic understatement said “could prove controversial” – but later toned
down its Principles in later 2012 (post-Greece, where there was much grumbling that domestic
banks, who held half the debt, sold out on the cheap to stay in good with the government on
whom they in turn might need support)114 to insist only upon fair and equal treatment of all
claims, meaning that no creditor group should be excluded ex ante.115 The IMF thinks this initial
stance is too strong and points out that “[i]n some cases, creditors may accept some
differentiation in the treatment of their claims, either to better fit with individual creditor
preferences or on the grounds that this would help limit the extent of economic dislocation,

112

Sovereign debt restructurings actually accord differential treatment with regularity to different stakeholders.
For example, the Seychelles paid domestic and foreign creditors differently because of concerns over failure of the
domestic banking sector, and Belize only restructured foreign debt but not domestically held debt. See
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK, 27‐28 (2013).
113
BETRAND COUILLANT & PIERRE‐FRANCOIS WEBER, TOWARDS A VOLUNTARY CODE OF GOOD CONDUCT FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING 156 (2003).
114
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK, 40‐41 (2013).
115
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maintain market access and preserve financial stability.”116 The point is not to resolve this hot
potato issue right now, it is merely to observe that the Certification Board could assess whether,
once the potato has cooled and a consensus standard emerges (and we will get there), compliance
has been achieved.117
Other areas where the Board might weigh in could be general comportment with the
principles of absolute priority (which would arise with quasi-sovereign entities like banks, a
question that in turn would depend on the Board’s scope). For secured creditors, too, attention
can be paid to the adequate preservation of liens, etc. Even with thorny issues, such as priorities,
the Board could possibly decide whether any claim inversion is appropriate, perhaps following
local insolvency law. The Board might even get into the sustainability question, delving into
insolvency vs. liquidity distress, but that might be getting into matters that are too delicate. The
point is for this to be light-touch analysis.118
The hardest thing might be questions of valuation and sustainability. That is, the gist of
the moral hazard concern in sovereign debt default is whether the sovereign can pay its debts but
just doesn’t want to.119 The Board could weigh in on this, perhaps using an open-ended standard
of “financial distress,” as opposed to a harder-line balance sheet analysis, consistent with the

116

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK, 41 (2013).
117
Similar consideration must be given to whether to treat voluntary from involuntary creditors differently in the
restructuring process. Cf. 11 U.S.C. 507 (according priority to some, but not all, involuntary creditors). One
wonders whether a nation should be able to discharge the claims of certain involuntary creditors, such as victims
of state‐sponsored terrorism and other torts. Cf Ben‐Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43
(D.D.C. 2008) (awarding damages to a group of survivors of the AMIA bombing).
118
The Board could of course complement myriad other proposals, such as Gros and Mayer’s idea of a Creditor
Registry for Eurobonds DANIEL GROS AND THOMAS MAYER, TOWARDS A EURO(PEAN) MONETARY FUND 5 (2010).
119
Steven L. Scharcz, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 Emory L.J. 1189, 1194 (2004).
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flexibility-favoring approach of the IMF.120 This wanders, however, into factually disputed
issues from which the Certification Board ought to steer clear. But even so, many defaults are so
clearly the consequence of financial distress it is hard to envision serious dispute.121 Would
anyone doubt Argentina was in financial distress back in 2001? Again, a U.S. analogy might
provide some instruction, such as to the gatekeeping factors to a chapter 9 municipal
reorganization that must be shown to establish a good-faith need to restructure debt.122 (The hard
case is odious debt default; I am candidly uncertain whether I would suggest the Board to assess
odiousness, which seems straying perhaps too far from the technocratic to the political.)123
One thing that ought to be beyond the Board’s purview would be mediating a priority
dispute across different bond issuances. Suppose a default trigger would launch a subsequent
issuance into priority over a prior issuance. Getting the Board in the middle of deciding the
(surely contested) issue of the triggering event might mire it into the powerful side-picking from
which this proposal tries to spare it. If the Board gets involved in dispute resolution, it loses its
capacity of being an above-the-fray arbiter of generic fairness. Two possible solutions could
work around this concern. First, the Board could conceivably get into contingent certification
(i.e., if X, then Y is fair, etc.), but that might be logistically too complicated. Alternatively, the
Board could recommend (even endorse) specific claims-ranking disputes to be sent to
international arbitration. The advantage of arbitration (apart from the generic ADR benefits of

120

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 9‐10 (2013).
121
Again borrowing from the domestic U.S. chapter 9 bankruptcy example, debtors have consistently prevailed
against litigants contending the financial distress eligibility screen to filing has not been met. See, e.g., In re City of
Stockton, No. 12‐32118‐C‐9, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2416, 31‐40 (June 12, 2013 Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013) (finding the
eligibility requirement of insolvency had been met under 11 U.S.C. s. 109(c).
122
11 U.S.C. §109(c).
123
Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi‐Sovereign Debt, 121 Yale L.J. 888, 928‐30 (2012)
(citing Republic of Ecuador, Noteholder Circular, at iii-iv (Apr. 20, 2009), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/felixsalmon/files/2009/04/noteholder-circular-goe-bond-offer.pdf (Letter from the Minister of Finance)).

30
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/81

30

Pottow:

arbitration over litigation in commercial matters)124 is that it avoids the state-affiliation of a home
court or the need to create an international one. True, many bond issuances already contain
choice of law and forum clauses,125 but the carving out of specific disputes for arbitration
resolution can de-politicize a potentially fractious scenario. It also avoids the issue of assetflight concerns for sovereign defendants. What it doesn’t solve, of course, is whether the arbitral
awards will ever be enforced. Keeping on the present example, Argentina has a good track
record of participating in several investor-state arbitrations (winning many) but has a poor record
of paying adverse awards.126 The recent certification of the Italian class action against sovereign
debt action under its BIT will be worth watching closely.127
If the purpose of this certification board proposal is to provide some “reputational
pressure” on sovereign debt stakeholders to come to consensus in the face of, say, a bond
exchange offering, then there arises a timing complication. The proposal has a perhaps stylized
scenario in which first a haircut is proposed, then creditors quietly cogitate over its terms as a
Certification Board offers its imprimatur, and finally the process of voting and tendering begins.
In domestic bankruptcy proceedings, such orderliness is not always the case. That point on its
own should not present problems, however, as sovereign debt restructuring seems to occur on a
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AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011).
Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric Posner, Political Risk and Sovereign Debt Contracts 8 (John. M. Olin Law &
Econ. Working Paper No. 583, Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 370, 2011) available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1962788.
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Luke Eric Peterson, Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Pile Up, but Investors Still Wait for a Payout, LAW.COM
(June 25, 2009) (last visited March 29, 2013 at 6:42pm), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202431736731&thepage=1&slreturn=20130229
183938.
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Abaclat and Others v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/0715, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisionon
Jurisdiction.pdf.
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glacial timeline without too many prepacks.128 The harder point is that even if a proposal is fair
in the abstract, at what threshold does one declare that there has been “a holdout”? That
determination requires an independent factual input wholly distinct from the underlying terms of
the proposal – an assessment of the significance of the number of creditors who have gone
along.129 Suppose a sovereign proposes an eminently fair haircut, offered to its creditors in an
above-board, nondiscriminatory manner, but then encounters genuine, good-faith lack of interest
from the creditors. If everyone’s holding out, that’s not holdout – that’s just unfortunate. Can
the Certification Board do anything about this?
It’s not clear. Yes, of course the Board could opine on this or any question. (One can
envision an intelligible holdout standard that would not require a fixed voting cut-off, like 75%;
it could just be a standard, like “overwhelming majority.”) The issue is how to deal with the
timing problem. The Board’s main work will be to certify an exchange proposal as “legitimate.”
For example, there was some suggestion that the initial Argentine offering—a “take it or leave
it” offer—was too heavy-handed to allow for meaningful negotiation;130 those are the precise
sorts of issues in which the Board should ideally get involved. But that all occurs pre-voting. If
we drag the Board back in ex post to cast the official condemnation of “holdout” on someone
who didn’t go along with the tender, we insert the Board into a far more powerful and
contentious position. That development could undercut the very delicate, soft-law influence the
128

MONETARY AND CAPITAL MARKETS DEP’T OF THE INT’L MONETARY FUND, A SURVEY OF EXPERIENCES WITH EMERGING MARKET
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS 1 (2012).
129
Cf. Mark L. J. Wright, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Problems and Prospects, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 154, 179‐83
(2012) (explaining the mechanics, current rise, and inherent problem of aggregation clauses in sovereign debt
contracts, “which [] allow for the imposition of settlement terms on the minority holders of individual bonds in the
context of a multi‐bond restructuring arrangement”).
130
Guachos and gadflies: Creditors’ decade‐long battle with Argentina shows just how tangled sovereign defaults
can be, The Economist, (Oct. 22, 2011), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21533453 (describing
Argentina’s offer to bondholders of 35 cents on the dollar as a “take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offer,” which was viewed as
“derisory” by the investment community). CF. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 11 (2013).
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Board is designed to have. Accordingly, to let the Board give an official scarlet H to the vulture
funds who are holding out is probably a bridge too far. Instead we should just let domestic
courts put two and two together by coupling the Board’s certification and the creditor votes to
draw their own conclusions.
Could this actually work? Hard to say, but there is little downside to trying, other than
the opportunity cost of distracting from something more whole-hog like SRDM if there’s
burgeoning political will to make that happen. (There’s not.)131 Absent opportunity cost
concerns, the Board could be a small step in corralling the vulture funds (and other actors) in the
sovereign debt world into more rational resolution of sovereign financial distress. How much a
role the Board has of course depends upon multiple factors, including a grittily legal-realist
assessment of just how judges interpret open law. For example, this article has made the modest
argument that surely certification could be a relevant factor of decision in weighing the propriety
of equitable relief. A more radical suggestion—which of course is merely raised academically—
would be to speculate that certification might affect more substantive legal determinations. We
may leave as a thought experiment whether, in the presence of such a certification, Judge Griesa
might have been inclined to take the narrower interpretation of the para passu clause advocated
by many.132 But that speculation is perhaps best left for another day.
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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 12‐13 (2013) (noting lengthy negotiations and delays).
132
To be clear, I am not in any way saying Argentina’s proposal would be certified. In fact, “no constructive
dialogue was observed and the authorities presented a non‐negotiated offer . . . more than three years after
default.” INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
FUND’S LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 36 (2013). This scarcely smacks of procedurally fair engagement and
negotiation.
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